Does regulation increase the rate at which doctors leave practice? Analysis of routine hospital data in the English NHS following the introduction of medical revalidation by Gutacker, Nils et al.
This is a repository copy of Does regulation increase the rate at which doctors leave 
practice? Analysis of routine hospital data in the English NHS following the introduction of 
medical revalidation.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/141512/
Version: Published Version
Article:
Gutacker, Nils orcid.org/0000-0002-2833-0621, Bloor, Karen Elizabeth 
orcid.org/0000-0003-4852-9854, Bojke, Chris et al. (2 more authors) (2019) Does 
regulation increase the rate at which doctors leave practice? Analysis of routine hospital 
data in the English NHS following the introduction of medical revalidation. BMC Medicine. 
ISSN 1741-7015 
https://doi.org/10.1186/s12916-019-1270-4
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) licence. This licence 
allows you to distribute, remix, tweak, and build upon the work, even commercially, as long as you credit the 
authors for the original work. More information and the full terms of the licence here: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
RESEARCH ARTICLE Open Access
Does regulation increase the rate at which
doctors leave practice? Analysis of routine
hospital data in the English NHS following
the introduction of medical revalidation
Nils Gutacker1* , Karen Bloor2, Chris Bojke3, Julian Archer4 and Kieran Walshe5
Abstract
Background: In 2012, the UK introduced medical revalidation, whereby to retain their licence all doctors are
required to show periodically that they are up to date and fit to practise medicine. Early reports suggested that
some doctors found the process overly onerous and chose to leave practice. This study investigates the effect of
medical revalidation on the rate at which consultants (senior hospital doctors) leave NHS practice, and assesses any
differences between the performance of consultants who left or remained in practice before and after the
introduction of revalidation.
Methods: We used a retrospective cohort of administrative data from the Hospital Episode Statistics database on all
consultants who were working in English NHS hospitals between April 2008 and March 2009 (n = 19,334), followed
to March 2015. Proportional hazard models were used to identify the effect of medical revalidation on the time to
exit from the NHS workforce, as implied by ceasing NHS clinical activity. The main exposure variable was
consultants’ time-varying revalidation status, which differentiates between periods when consultants were (a) not
subject to revalidation—before the policy was introduced, (b) awaiting a revalidation recommendation and (c) had
received a positive recommendation to be revalidated. Difference-in-differences analysis was used to compare the
performance of those who left practice with those who remained in practice before and after the introduction of
revalidation, as proxied by case-mix-adjusted 30-day mortality rates.
Results: After 2012, consultants who had not yet revalidated were at an increased hazard of ceasing NHS clinical
practice (HR 2.33, 95% CI 2.12 to 2.57) compared with pre-policy levels. This higher risk remained after a positive
recommendation (HR 1.85, 95% CI 1.65 to 2.06) but was statistically significantly reduced (p < 0.001). We found no
statistically significant differences in mortality rates between those consultants who ceased practice and those who
remained, after adjustment for multiple testing.
Conclusion: Revalidation appears to have led to greater numbers of doctors ceasing clinical practice, over and
above other contemporaneous influences. Those ceasing clinical practice do not appear to have provided lower
quality care, as approximated by mortality rates, when compared with those remaining in practice.
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Background
Systems of medical regulation exist around the world, to
protect patients and assure the public of the competence
and quality of medical practitioners. Traditionally, medi-
cine, like other learned professions, has regulated itself,
setting and monitoring high standards of education, con-
trolling entry into the profession and encouraging ethical
behaviour based on underlying altruistic principles. Con-
fidence in the medical profession ranks higher than
many other areas of life [1], but the public trust upon
which self-regulation relies has apparently been eroded
in recent years, in all social institutions, including health
care systems [2]. Regulatory systems have emerged as a
result of this erosion of trust, but these have also come
under scrutiny: the ‘quest for accountability’ has resulted
in detailed control and a change in culture and perform-
ance management which may be viewed as ‘distorting
the proper aims of professional practice and indeed as
damaging professional pride and integrity’ [3]. Balancing
public protection with professional respect in regulating
medicine is difficult but essential.
In the UK, public outcry over some failures of medical
regulation (most notably errors by paediatric cardiac sur-
geons in Bristol [4] and the activities of a prolific serial
killer in general practice [5]) resulted in reforms of pre-
vious regulatory processes. The governance of the na-
tional medical regulator, the General Medical Council
(GMC), was reformed to make council members
appointed rather than elected and to increase lay repre-
sentation. Self-regulation was widely deemed ineffective,
and the profession left ‘fatally vulnerable to the problem
of “bad apples”: those unwilling, incapable or indifferent
to delivering on their professional commitments and
who betrayed the trust of both patients and peers’ [6].
Introduced in December 2012, medical revalidation is
a process by which all practising doctors in the UK now
have to show periodically that they are up-to-date and
fit to practise medicine. Revalidation was viewed as a
‘historic’ change, which would ‘make a major contribu-
tion to the quality of care that patients receive’ and ‘give
them valuable assurance that the doctors who treat them
are regularly assessed’ (Sir Peter Rubin, quoted in [7]).
Its development has been closely observed by inter-
national medical regulators [8], and those regulating
other health professions such as nursing and midwifery
[9]. Its policy objectives are ‘trust, assurance and safety’
[10]: maintaining and improving public confidence in
the profession, assuring the general public of the quality
of medical care they are likely to receive, improving the
quality of medical performance, assessing the fitness to
practise of individual doctors and ensuring early detec-
tion of individuals who are failing to provide safe and ef-
fective clinical care. Revalidation applies to all doctors
who wish to retain a licence to practise in the UK. The
process does not include standardised tests, but involves
a system of annual appraisal, maintenance of a portfolio
of supporting information and a review and revalidation
recommendation, made by a ‘responsible officer’ (RO)
usually every 5 years. Supporting information includes
data on activities such as continuing professional devel-
opment, quality improvement, significant events and
learning from them, and feedback from patients and col-
leagues, including complaints and compliments [11].
Time and, to a lesser degree, financial costs may be con-
siderable. The RO is usually a senior doctor, who makes
revalidation recommendations to the GMC. Doctors are
attached to a ‘designated body’ and to a RO—in hospital
medicine this would often be a medical director, but in
general practice and other settings, arrangements are
made through clinical commissioning groups or directly
with the GMC. This system means that doctors report
to other doctors, which maintains professional control
of the regulatory process. Appraisals have been a con-
tractual obligation in the National Health Service (NHS)
since 2003, but before 2012 they were less standardised,
and implementation had been slow: annual appraisal
rates for hospital consultants in England were 64% in
2010 and 88% in 2015/16 [12].
Revalidation recommendations can result in three pos-
sible outcomes: (1) the doctor is revalidated, (2) the doc-
tor’s revalidation is deferred until a later date or (3) the
doctor does not engage with the revalidation process
and is given a notice of non-engagement (GMC 2012).
Out of the three outcomes, only deferral and non-en-
gagement pose a theoretical threat to a doctor’s licence;
however, as a wide range of circumstances may also lead
to a deferral, a deferral decision is viewed by the GMC
as a neutral act [13].
Since before its introduction, there have been concerns
about the administrative and emotional burden of medical
revalidation [14]. There were early reports that some doc-
tors, particularly older doctors, found the process overly
onerous and chose to leave practice rather than complete
it [15]. A qualitative study in general practice reported
some doctors describing it as ‘the final straw’ that
prompted a decision to retire [16]. A recent survey of all
UK doctors revealed scepticism about whether revalid-
ation led to improved patient safety or identifying doctors
in difficulty early, and re-iterated concerns about time
costs and administrative burden [17]. On average, respon-
dents reported spending 26.4 h preparing for and attend-
ing their most recent appraisal. A policy review published
in early 2017 explored this further, confirming that reval-
idation feels ‘burdensome and ineffective to some doctors’
(p.27), and reporting that individual doctors and their rep-
resentative bodies have expressed a view that some doc-
tors have relinquished their licence purely because they do
not want to meet the requirements of revalidation [12].
Gutacker et al. BMC Medicine           (2019) 17:33 Page 2 of 12
All doctors practising in UK medicine must have a li-
cence to practise with the General Medical Council
(GMC), but the reverse is not the case: not all doctors
on the register are currently in clinical practice. Many
doctors who no longer practise may have chosen to keep
their licence in the past, for various reasons. At present,
around 280,000 doctors are on the register [18] and
140,000 doctors are employed by the UK NHS [19].
Figures released by the GMC noted that in the 3 years
before the introduction of medical revalidation (Novem-
ber 2009 to December 2012), 7994 doctors relinquished
their licence to practise, and in three and a half years fol-
lowing its introduction (December 2012 to July 2016),
this figure was 33,148 (+ 256%) [20]. It is important to
note that this may not be actively practising doctors
leaving the profession, but if they are no longer practis-
ing, they are likely to have been prompted to relinquish
this by the introduction of revalidation. From the GMC
register, there is no way of separating practising clini-
cians (in the NHS or elsewhere) from those who no lon-
ger practise in any clinical setting but, nevertheless, in
the past, still retained a licence.
Our study used activity and mortality data from hospi-
tals in the English NHS to assess the effect of revalidation
on the number of doctors who ceased NHS clinical activ-
ity, focusing on whether revalidation prompted consul-
tants to cease NHS practice, and whether this is restricted
to older age groups. In subsequent analysis, we tested
whether the likelihood of ceasing practice as a result of
medical revalidation was associated with consultant per-
formance as measured by case-mix-adjusted 30-day mor-
tality rates.
Methods
Study design and data sources
We undertook a retrospective cohort study analysing
clinical activity and outcome data from English Hospital
Episode Statistics (HES) for the period April 2009 to
March 2016. The cohort comprised all consultants who
were responsible for episodes of NHS-funded inpatient
care in English hospitals in the financial year 2008/09 (1
April to 31 March). The unit of recording in the HES
dataset is the finished consultant episode (FCE, a period
that a patient spends in the continuous care of a con-
sultant), which is assigned to consultants based on their
person-identifiable consultant code recorded in HES,
which links to their GMC number. Primary speciality
was derived from HES and was coded as medical, surgi-
cal or other.
Data on consultants’ age and gender, the date of their
full registration with the GMC and information on the
dates of revalidation meetings and ROs’ subsequent rec-
ommendations were requested from the GMC. These
data were provided for all consultants that held a period
of registration between April 2008 and July 2016. Add-
itional information on consultants’ current employment
status was derived from the electronic staff record (ESR)
system, and these data were provided by the NHS Digital
Organisation Data Service (ODS). The ESR covers NHS
Trusts but not independent providers. We used the lat-
est release of the ESR data from February 2017.
Information on 30-day mortality after admission for all
patients who received treatment during the study period
was provided by the Office for National Statistics.
We excluded consultants from analysis if their consult-
ant code recorded in HES could not be matched against
the GMC specialist register or the GMC register was
otherwise incomplete, or if they were responsible for fewer
than 52 patient episodes (FCEs) (i.e. one per week on aver-
age) during the period April 2008 to March 2009.
Risk of ceasing NHS clinical practice
Outcome definition
The primary outcome was end of clinical activity in the
English NHS for any reason (referred to from here as
‘exit’). Consultants were deemed to be clinically active at
any given date if they took responsibility for at least one
FCE on this or any subsequent date until the end of the
data period (31 March 2016). Consultants were also
deemed to be clinically active until after the end of the
data period if we found them to be employed by an
NHS Trust in February 2017 (from the most recent
available electronic staff record), which accounts for pro-
longed absences due to, for example, maternity leave or
research leave.
Hypotheses
The policy intervention was the introduction of
mandatory medical revalidation in December 2012. Doc-
tors were informed about the scheduled date of their re-
validation at approximately the same time.
We hypothesised that the effect of the policy would be
to increase the hazard of exit and that this effect would
differ according to individual consultants’ revalidation
status, which could vary over time and take four differ-
ent forms (Fig. 1 illustrates the possible transition path-
ways graphically):
1. Pre-policy implementation—consultant is not
subject to revalidation (before December 2012)
2. Post-policy—consultant is preparing for the first
revalidation
3. Post-policy—a recommendation has been made to
defer the revalidation decision, or the RO has
reported non-engagement
4. Post-policy—a recommendation has been made that
the consultant should be revalidated
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We further hypothesised that the hazard of exit would
return to pre-policy levels once consultants received a
recommendation that they should be revalidated.
Statistical analysis
Semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard models were
estimated to identify the effect of medical revalidation
on the time to exit. The policy intervention was mod-
elled as a set of time-varying covariates that segregated
the post-policy period according to consultants’ revalid-
ation status (preparation, deferral or failure to engage,
positive recommendation). The coefficients associated
with these covariates measure the change in hazard from
the pre-policy period.
We measured time at risk as days from the date the
consultant first held a full registration with the GMC.
This variable was left-truncated (delayed entry) since we
considered only consultants that had not exited before 1
April 2009. Follow-up was until 31 December 2015 to
ensure that brief absences around the end of the data
period (March 2016), for example due to annual leave,
would not be labelled erroneously as exit (this is relevant
only for consultants that were not employed by an NHS
Trust in February 2017). Data were analysed until exit or
the end of follow-up (right-censoring).
Our primary analysis adjusted for factors that may be
associated with a risk of leaving practice: consultants’
age at start of follow-up (5-year bands with separate cat-
egories for ≤ 40 and > 65), sex, age-sex interactions,
whether they received their primary medical qualifica-
tion outside the UK, main speciality of activity in 2008/
09 (coded as medical, surgical and other), volume of ac-
tivity (number of FCEs) in 2008/09 (coded as 52–200,
201–500, 501–1000, > 1000) and an interaction between
speciality and volume. We also performed stratified ana-
lyses by age group, gender and training location.
We assessed the robustness of our results through sev-
eral sensitivity analyses. First, we restricted follow-up to
the first year after the policy introduction, i.e. until 30
November 2013. Second, we based outcomes on HES
data only (not including electronic staff record data). In
this case, we followed consultants until 31 March 2015
to allow for prolonged (1-year) periods of absence. Fi-
nally, we estimated parametric survival models covering
a range of distributional assumptions.
Estimates are reported as hazard ratios (HRs) with as-
sociated 95% confidence intervals (CIs). Values larger
than 1 indicate increased risk of exit. Standard errors
were clustered at a hospital level. All analyses were per-
formed in Stata version 14 (StataCorp, College Station,
TX, USA).
Change in the clinical performance of consultants ceasing
activity
Outcome definition
The outcome of interest was patient mortality within 30
days of admission. The analysis was restricted to the last
FCE within a patient’s hospital stay, and the outcome
was therefore assigned to the last consultant providing
care as part of the hospital stay. In sensitivity analysis,
we assigned outcomes to the first consultant providing
care during the hospital stay.
Hypothesis
Medical revalidation may influence poorer performing
consultants differently compared with higher performing
clinicians. If they believe their own performance is lower
than the standard required, they may choose to cease
Fig. 1 Revalidation states and transition pathways
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practice if they judge the high effort required to achieve
improvements in care quality to outweigh the benefits of
retaining a licence. Alternatively, poorer performers may
hold overly favourable views of their own ability [21].
We therefore hypothesise that differences in mortality
rates between groups of consultants who cease NHS
practice (‘leavers’) and those who remain (‘stayers’)
could change following the introduction of medical
revalidation.
Statistical analysis
To test whether the policy intervention is associated
with a change in the performance of consultants ceasing
activity (as measured by their 30-day mortality rates), we
adopted a difference-in-differences (DID) design using
‘stayers’ as a control group. This accounts for contem-
poraneous changes in medical technology and other ex-
ternal pressures on the health system that apply to
‘leavers’ and ‘stayers’ alike. We estimated separate logistic
regression models of 30-day mortality in NHS-funded
patients aged 60–89 treated in the pre-policy period
(April 2010 to March 2012) and the post-policy period
(April 2013 to March 2014). In each model, we included
an indicator variable for consultants ceasing clinical ac-
tivity during this time period. We used the resulting co-
efficient estimates to calculate the average marginal
effect of leaver/stayer status over the entire patient
population in that period. The DID estimate denotes the
difference between these effects and reflects the change
in this performance gap over time that is associated with
medical revalidation. If the gap increases after the intro-
duction of revalidation, this would suggest that the
group of doctors leaving practice include a higher pro-
portion of poorer performers. These analyses were per-
formed separately for consultants working in medical
and surgical specialties. Consultants working in other
specialties were excluded because their patients’ profiles
were deemed too heterogeneous for meaningful com-
parison of outcomes.
All regressions models also adjust for a range of pa-
tient characteristics, including patients’ age (in 5-year
bands), sex, number of Elixhauser co-morbid conditions
(coded as 0, 1, 2–3, 4–6, ≥ 7), an indicator of any emer-
gency hospital admissions in the past 365 days, and the
Healthcare Resource Group (HRG; the English equiva-
lent of DRGs) root to which the patient had been allo-
cated. The latter adjusts for differences in case-mix and
inherent mortality risk across consultants working in dif-
ferent specialties.
Estimates are reported as (differences in) mortality
rates with associated 95% confidence intervals (CIs).
Standard errors were clustered at a hospital level. All
analyses were performed in Stata version 14 (StataCorp,
College Station, TX, USA).
Results
Risk of ceasing NHS clinical practice
A total of 29,387 unique consultant codes were recorded
in the HES dataset in the period 1 April 2008 to 31
March 2009. Of these, 4392 could not be linked to the
GMC register or the register was incomplete, and 5661
were responsible for fewer than 52 FCEs. These consult-
ant codes and the associated clinical activity were ex-
cluded from analysis. The remaining 19,334 consultants
were followed from 1 April 2009 for a total of 44.4 mil-
lion days (Table 1). The median follow-up was 2465
days, around 6.7 years (mean = 2298 days, 6.3 years). Ap-
proximately 17.9% of consultants (n = 3452) ceased to be
clinically active before the end of the data analysis
period. Of these, 19.9% (n = 689) had received a positive
revalidation recommendation prior to exit. Figure 2
shows the Kaplan-Meier survival function and the asso-
ciated hazard function for the cohort of consultants. The
vertical dashed line indicates the introduction of medical
revalidation in December 2012. Figure 3 shows the cu-
mulative number of consultants ceasing clinical activity
over time and the number of those that would have been
expected to leave because they reached retirement age
(65 years). The difference between the observed and pre-
dicted number of exits appears to grow after the intro-
duction of medical revalidation.
For the cohort as a whole, the proportion of consul-
tants who received a positive revalidation recommenda-
tion increased steadily by approximately 1.9% per month
after the policy introduction and reached 85.3% by
December 2015. ROs issued a recommendation to defer
or reported non-engagement for 1816 consultants, of
which 1278 subsequently received a positive
Table 1 Time spent in each of the revalidation states
Revalidation status Number of consultant-years in revalidation state
Overall Per consultant
Pre-revalidation 68,866 3.6
Policy in place 29,736 1.5
Deferred/non-engagement 918 0.0
Revalidated 22,215 1.1
Total 121,735 6.3
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recommendation. The median deferral period was 147
days (interquartile range = 113 to 273).
Table 2 presents the final revalidation status at the end
of follow-up or time of exit. Consultants who ceased
clinical activity before the end of the follow-up period
were less likely to have received a positive revalidation
recommendation than those that continued clinical ac-
tivity (38.2% vs. 96.3%, χ2(1) = 7941; p < 0.001). The pro-
portion of consultants ceasing practice after a decision
had been deferred is over twice that measured at the
end of follow-up (3.9% vs. 1.6%, χ2(1) = 77.6; p < 0.001).
Table 3 presents the results of the analysis of risk of
exit, together with descriptive statistics of the sample.
Consultants awaiting their first revalidation recommen-
dation were at higher risk of exit than before they be-
came subject to revalidation (HR 2.33; 95% CI 2.12 to
2.57), and the hazard further increased after a recom-
mendation to defer or a report of non-engagement (HR
3.51; 95% CI 2.71 to 4.55) (χ2(1) = 10.19; p = 0.001). A
positive recommendation was also associated with an in-
creased risk of exit compared with pre-policy levels (HR
1.85; 95% CI 1.65 to 2.06) but the hazard was statistically
significantly lower than while awaiting the first revalid-
ation meeting (χ2(1) = 24.36; p < 0.001).
The hazard of exit was independently associated with
consultants’ age (older doctors had a higher risk of exit)
and was also higher for non-UK trained doctors com-
pared with those who trained in UK medical schools
(HR 1.29; 95% CI 1.16 to 1.43). Consultants working in
surgical specialties were at higher risk of exit than those
working in medical specialties (HR 1.76; 95% CI 1.34 to
2.32). Risk of exit was negatively associated with volume
of activity in 2008 for all specialties (see
Additional file 1).
Stratified analyses by age group, gender or country of
primary medical qualification confirm the findings of the
main analysis and show an increased risk of exit for con-
sultants awaiting their first revalidation meeting
(Table 4). The difference in the hazard of exit when
awaiting revalidation and after having successfully revali-
dated is not statistically significant different for women
(p = 0.082), or consultants aged 51–55 (p = 0.464), 61–65
(p = 0.136) or > 65 (p = 0.810) at the beginning of
follow-up. Full regression results are presented in Add-
itional files 2, 3, 4 and 5.
Results were robust to sensitivity analysis using alter-
native modelling choices including the definition of the
outcome and the follow-up period, and to parametric
modelling of the hazard function (Table 4).
Change in the clinical performance of consultants ceasing
activity
Figure 4 shows unadjusted 30-day mortality rates for
‘leavers’ and ‘stayers’, by speciality, admission type and fi-
nancial year. Table 5 reports group differences for the
pre- and post-policy periods (see Additional file 6 for a
tabulation of (un) adjusted rates by group and period).
There was no statistically significant difference in
risk-adjusted mortality rates between ‘leavers’ and
‘stayers’ during the pre-policy period. Risk-adjusted mor-
tality rates improved over time for patients treated by
‘stayers’ but remained largely constant for patients
treated by ‘leavers’, thus indicating an increasing
performance gap between these groups. However,
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improvements were generally small and only the DID es-
timate for the group of elective admissions in surgical
specialities was statistically significant (p = 0.048). None
of the differences remain statistically significant once we
apply a Bonferroni correction to counteract the problem
of multiple comparisons (which results in a critical value
of 0.05/4 = 0.0125). Very similar results were obtained
when allocating patients to the first consultant in their
hospital stay (see Additional file 7).
Regression coefficients used for risk-adjustment are re-
ported in Additional file 8 and Additional file 9.
Discussion
Medical revalidation in the UK has reformed regulation
of the profession, in response to earlier regulatory fail-
ures. Its implementation has been closely observed by
regulators of other professions and by medical regulators
around the world. Assessing its implementation, includ-
ing any unintended consequences that result, is of con-
siderable policy interest.
The introduction of medical revalidation in 2012 was
associated with an increased risk of hospital consultants
subsequently ceasing NHS clinical practice. This finding
Fig. 3 Number of consultants ceasing activity; observed vs. predicted based on retirement at age 65
Table 2 Last revalidation recommendation at exit or end of follow-up
Consultants ceasing clinical activity Consultants continuing clinical activity until end of follow-up Difference
Revalidation recommendation N % N % χ2(1) p value
Awaiting recommendation 1991 57.70% 322 2.00% 8337.9 < 0.001
Revalidate 1319 38.20% 15,301 96.30% 7941.2 < 0.001
Defer 134 3.90% 250 1.60% 77.6 < 0.001
Non-engagement 8 0.20% 9 0.10% 9.9 0.002
Total 3452 15,882
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Table 3 Association between consultants’ characteristics, revalidation status and hazard of exit
Variable N (%) HR 95% CI
Specialty
Medical 10,567 (54.7) (base category)
Other 1332 (6.9) 1.76 (1.38 to 2.23)
Surgical 7435 (38.5) 1.76 (1.34 to 2.31)
Volume of activity in 2008
53–99 1424 (7.4) (base category)
100–199 1829 (9.5) 0.81 (0.67 to 0.98)
200–299 1542 (8.0) 0.84 (0.67 to 1.06)
300–399 1576 (8.2) 0.71 (0.57 to 0.89)
400–499 1510 (7.8) 0.94 (0.74 to 1.18)
≥ 500 11,453 (59.2) 0.63 (0.53 to 0.74)
Volume × specialty
Other × 100–199 305 (1.6) 1.30 (0.92 to 1.83)
Other × 200–299 117 (0.6) 0.80 (0.53 to 1.20)
Other × 300–399 68 (0.4) 0.66 (0.34 to 1.27)
Other × 400–499 43 (0.2) 0.74 (0.37 to 1.48)
Other × ≥ 500 303 (1.6) 0.42 (0.28 to 0.61)
Surgical × 100–199 427 (2.2) 0.85 (0.61 to 1.19)
Surgical × 200–299 619 (3.2) 0.71 (0.50 to 0.99)
Surgical × 300–399 759 (3.9) 0.68 (0.48 to 0.96)
Surgical × 400–499 814 (4.2) 0.42 (0.30 to 0.60)
Surgical × ≥ 500 4615 (23.9) 0.54 (0.41 to 0.72)
Country of primary medical qualification
UK trained 13,487 (69.8) (base category)
Foreign trained 5847 (30.2) 1.29 (1.16 to 1.43)
Consultant age (in 2008)
≤ 40 3336 (17.3) (base category)
41–45 5032 (26.0) 1.17 (0.98 to 1.40)
46–50 4250 (22.0) 1.28 (1.05 to 1.56)
51–55 3259 (16.9) 1.76 (1.42 to 2.19)
56–60 2172 (11.2) 2.67 (2.09 to 3.42)
61–65 1117 (5.8) 3.42 (2.58 to 4.54)
> 65 168 (0.9) 3.04 (2.11 to 4.39)
Consultant gender
Male 15,386 (79.6) (base category)
Female 3948 (20.4) 0.90 (0.70 to 1.14)
Revalidation status
Pre-policy—not subject to revalidation (base category)
Post-policy—awaiting revalidation 2.33 (2.12 to 2.57)
Post-policy—deferred/non-engagement 3.51 (2.71 to 4.55)
Post-policy—revalidated 1.85 (1.65 to 2.06)
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applies across all age groups. Consultants awaiting their
first revalidation recommendation were at higher risk of
leaving, and the hazard further increased after a deferral
or non-engagement recommendation. A positive revalid-
ation recommendation reduced the risk but was still as-
sociated with an increased risk of exit compared with
pre-policy levels for older consultants. Other contem-
poraneous changes to the labour market and working
environment (e.g. organisational change in the NHS, in-
cluding those made as a result of the Health and Social
Care Act [22] or the reduction of the limit on UK pen-
sion savings from 2012 onwards [23]) may also have led
to an increased risk of exit independent of the introduc-
tion of medical revalidation. The observed increase in
the hazard of exit while consultants await their first re-
validation recommendation is likely to be confounded by
these contemporaneous, external influences. But, under
the assumption that the hazard of exit following a posi-
tive recommendation fully reflects these confounding in-
fluences, the difference between the hazards in the
‘preparing for revalidation’ and ‘positive recommenda-
tion’ states may be interpreted as a causal effect of the
policy intervention. Difference-in-differences analysis
does not support the hypothesis of an increase in mor-
tality rates of consultants who left practice compared
with those who stayed in practice after the introduction
of medical revalidation in 2012.
This research has several important strengths com-
pared with earlier reports of the effect of medical reval-
idation. Firstly, we use a data source that reflects actual
NHS practice, rather than the GMC register, which does
not differentiate between clinically active doctors and
those that hold a licence but no longer practise. Sec-
ondly, we use robust quasi-experimental methods and
Table 4 Stratified analyses of association between consultants’ revalidation status and hazard of exit and sensitivity analyses based
on alternative modelling approaches. All regression models adjust for consultant characteristics (not reported)
N (2) Post-policy—awaiting
revalidation
(3) Post-policy—deferred/
non-engaged
(4) Post-policy—revalidated Difference
(2)–(4)
HR 95% CI HR 95% CI HR 95% CI χ2 p value
Stratified analysis
By consultant age
≤ 40 3336 1.94 (1.42 to 2.64) 0.87 (0.13 to 5.99) 1.02 (0.67 to 1.56) 9.96 0.002
41–45 5032 2.73 (2.12 to 3.52) 6.55 (3.67 to 11.69) 1.30 (0.91 to 1.87) 23.37 < 0.001
46–50 4250 2.85 (2.21 to 3.66) 5.53 (2.65 to 11.52) 2.12 (1.55 to 2.90) 4.96 0.026
51–55 3259 2.52 (1.97 to 3.23) 3.26 (1.70 to 6.27) 2.35 (1.82 to 3.05) 0.54 0.464
56–60 2172 1.94 (1.62 to 2.34) 2.92 (1.79 to 4.75) 1.35 (1.09 to 1.68) 15.73 < 0.001
61–65 1117 1.88 (1.55 to 2.29) 1.47 (0.76 to 2.81) 1.57 (1.20 to 2.04) 2.23 0.136
> 65 168 2.45 (1.68 to 3.56) 3.81 (0.99 to 14.69) 2.24 (1.02 to 4.89) 0.06 0.810
By consultant gender
Male 15,386 2.41 (2.18 to 2.67) 3.43 (2.58 to 4.58) 1.90 (1.68 to 2.14) 21.98 < 0.001
Female 3948 2.01 (1.63 to 2.48) 3.67 (2.04 to 6.61) 1.60 (1.23 to 2.09) 3.02 0.082
By country of primary medical qualification
UK trained 13,487 2.07 (1.84 to 2.33) 2.71 (1.95 to 3.76) 1.60 (1.38 to 1.84) 19.84 < 0.001
Foreign trained 5847 2.49 (2.17 to 2.86) 4.66 (3.15 to 6.90) 1.89 (1.57 to 2.28) 11.28 < 0.001
Sensitivity analyses
Follow-up until 30/11/2014 (based on
HES + ESR)
19,334 2.08 (1.90 to 2.27) 2.95 (2.08 to 4.18) 1.73 (1.54 to 1.95) 10.18 0.001
Follow-up until 31/03/2015 (based on
HES + ESR)
19,334 1.98 (1.80 to 2.18) 2.53 (1.72 to 3.72) 1.37 (1.20 to 1.57) 32.80 < 0.001
Follow-up until 31/03/2015 (based on
HES only)
19,334 1.61 (1.43 to 1.81) 0.57 (0.08 to 4.13) 1.14 (0.83 to 1.57) 4.10 0.043
Parametric model—Exponential 19,334 2.67 (2.44 to 2.91) 4.14 (3.23 to 5.29) 2.20 (1.98 to 2.45) 15.72 < 0.001
Parametric model—Weibull 19,334 2.67 (2.43 to 2.92) 4.14 (3.23 to 5.30) 2.21 (1.97 to 2.47) 15.70 < 0.001
Parametric model—Gompertz 19,334 2.38 (2.17 to 2.62) 3.63 (2.82 to 4.67) 1.89 (1.69 to 2.12) 23.02 < 0.001
Parametric model—Log-Normal 19,334 0.36 (0.26 to 0.49) 0.15 (0.07 to 0.31) 0.50 (0.39 to 0.64) 20.40 < 0.001
Parametric model—Log-Logistic 19,334 0.72 (0.69 to 0.76) 0.58 (0.49 to 0.67) 0.83 (0.79 to 0.87) 39.23 < 0.001
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Fig. 4 Thirty-day mortality rates (95% CI) of stayers and leavers, 2008 to 2014
Table 5 Difference in mortality rates between leavers and stayers by specialty and time period
Index admission Difference pre-policy Difference post-policy Difference-in-difference
Est SE p value Est SE p value Est SE p value
Unadjusted comparison
Consultants working in medical specialties
Emergency 0.001 0.002 0.498 0.013 0.002 < 0.001 0.012 0.003 < 0.001
Elective − 0.0001 0.001 0.856 0.002 0.001 < 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.015
Consultants working in surgical specialties
Emergency − 0.006 0.002 < 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.430 0.008 0.003 0.011
Elective 0.000 0.000 0.491 0.001 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.001 0.403
Risk-adjusted comparison
Consultants working in medical specialties
Emergency − 0.0014 0.004 0.733 0.009 0.008 0.268 0.011 0.009 0.252
Elective − 0.00026 0.002 0.887 0.003 0.003 0.263 0.003 0.003 0.310
Consultants working in surgical specialties
Emergency 0.00096 0.0022 0.657 0.001 0.003 0.816 0.000 0.004 0.964
Elective 0.000 0.000 0.950 0.001 0.000 0.009 0.001 0.001 0.048
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detailed data. Linking HES with the GMC register per-
mits us to assess the likelihood of ceasing clinical activ-
ity, the characteristics of doctors who do and of the
patients they treat. Doctors were issued with different
revalidation dates and although these were not necessar-
ily random we exploited this variation to estimate ro-
bustly the effect of the policy, reducing the risk of
confounding by other events. Finally, using information
on patient health outcomes before and after the intro-
duction of medical revalidation allowed us to assess the
performance of consultants who ceased practice follow-
ing revalidation compared with those who remain.
There are nevertheless a number of limitations to the
analysis. First, we focus solely on hospital consultants
(fully trained specialists), not doctors in training, those
in primary care or other settings. Second, scheduled re-
validation dates were not made available to us and are
therefore, in our datasets, unobserved for doctors that
left practice before their revalidation meeting, or for
which revalidation is scheduled to occur after the end of
our data window. We observe the date of revalidation
only for those who completed the process and received a
recommendation. Third, some consultants may stop tak-
ing charge of care episodes but still provide care as part
of a wider team. This may induce measurement error,
especially if consultants subsequently stopped working
in an NHS trust before February 2017. Fourth, as our
data are derived from Hospital Episodes Statistics, con-
sultants are viewed as ceasing practice if they no longer
take charge of care episodes in English NHS hospitals—
they may continue to work in non-clinical roles or in
other hospitals (e.g. in the private sector, or in other
countries of the UK) or in primary care. Finally, 30-day
mortality rates have been criticised as imperfect mea-
sures of healthcare quality, especially when case-mix ad-
justment is restricted to the limited information
collected in administrative databases [24].
Our findings are consistent with concerns expressed in
qualitative studies and surveys, and with early evidence
from the GMC that doctors were relinquishing their li-
cence to practice following the introduction of medical
revalidation [12, 15, 16]. Ongoing qualitative research
[17, 25] further informs the reasons for this apparent
change in the likelihood of consultants ceasing NHS prac-
tice. These reports suggest that the administrative burden
and inflexibility has had an effect, but there may also be
more fundamental questions about whether mechanisms
that monitor performance can undermine morale in
healthcare professionals [3]. We are not aware of any
other research exploring the performance of consultants
leaving the profession in response to medical revalidation.
The overall size of the consultant workforce is increas-
ing despite the higher risk of consultants leaving. This is
because of expansions in medical school intake since
1997, which have resulted in increased fully trained con-
sultants over recent years [26, 27]. The increased risk of
ceasing NHS practice may be a one-off effect, and longer
term research will be required to determine this.
Conclusion
The introduction of medical revalidation in England in-
creased the risk of hospital consultants ceasing clinical
activity. There is no evidence that those ceasing NHS
practice provided, on average, lower quality care, as
measured by patient mortality within 30 days of
admission.
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